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Abstract

Maintaining an adequate level of aircraft availability through Agile Combat
Support (ACS) is crucial for the Air Force to perform its mission. During normal day to
day operations, demands for depot repair including spare parts and maintenance manhours typically fall within a range supportable with current assets and capabilities.
However, with increased flying operations during a conflict, demand at the depot level
may likely exceed current capacity for timely support, resulting in backorders for spares
and increased turnaround times. This thesis develops a discrete event simulation of the F16 engine repair network to investigate the impact on engine availability (a major driver
of aircraft availability) from three key factors: the spare engine modules inventory levels,
the induction rate of failed modules, and the repair turnaround time for the engine
modules. Our baseline simulation captures the F-16 engine repair network at a top level
for normal day to day operations. We then insert a range of increases in operational
tempo in our simulation and analyze the effects on the engine repair network.
Incorporating different policies for replenishing depleted spares levels from increased
demands allows us to explore the responsiveness of industrial base output in maintaining
aircraft engine availability.
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SIMULATION MODELING AND ANALYSIS OF AIR FORCE DEPOT ENGINE
REPAIR DURING NORMAL AND INCREASED OPERATIONAL TEMPOS

I. Introduction
Background
The Air Force’s capability to fly, fight and win depends on the ability to carry out
required missions effectively and timely. In order to support missions over a long
duration in such a manner, aircraft must be available over the period of operations. The
availability of mission capable aircraft can be modeled based on the rate of repair,
induction rate of failed parts, and availability of spares in maintenance inventory. The
availability of mission capable aircraft increases when maintenance inventory level and
rate of repair are high, but the availability decreases if the induction rate of failed parts
increases. However, maintaining a high level of spares and reducing the rate of repair
turnaround time is expensive. In today’s austere budgetary environment, the Air Force
cannot allocate large resources to maintain high level of on-demand inventory and repair
turnaround time indefinitely. If the induction rate is consistent, the inventory level and
rate of repair can be maintained at a level selected to efficiently support normal
operations and desired availability. But the uncertain nature of military demand from a
crisis, causing a transition from peacetime to war time operations, would increase
induction rate. Additionally, the acquisition lead time for critical aircraft spares is long
and the spares production capability is limited by the industrial base output capacity, so
the spares cannot be supplied just in time from industry. When sharp increase in spares
1

demand occurs during war time, the decrease in availability of mission capable aircraft is
inevitable. Therefore decision makers need to prioritize resource investment to best meet
aircraft availability requirements. Our research focuses on three different factors where
additional resources could be applied to improve aircraft availability during increased
operational tempo. We examine the impact of these factors for the F-16 engine repair
network.
Scope and Objective
The aircraft repair network is a complex system involving hundreds of parts. This
thesis develops a discrete event simulation to investigate the repair network for the F100229 engine. Our baseline simulation models this engine repair network using five major
engine repair modules for normal day to day operations, with the ability to easily increase
the operational tempo and to modify levels of three factors that drive engine availability.
According to Hill and others (2015), the five major replaceable modules used in our
research are reasonable component units to represent performance of the network. The
objective of this research is to explore the impact of three factors: the engine module
induction rate, the engine module depot turnaround time, and the engine module spares
inventory level to the availability of mission capable aircraft during normal and increased
operational tempos. In addition, we also consider the impact of industrial base output
when spares levels drop during increasing operations requiring additional spares to be
ordered.
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Approach
The current repair network is modeled as a discrete event simulation using
existing maintenance data provided by AFMC/A9A. The input parameters are modified
to represent changes in demand or spares availability to determine how different factors
affect engine repair network performance. The performance of the network is measured
in terms of spare inventory and back order status. The spares inventory status shows the
average number of spares used, and the back order status shows the number of parts
awaiting spares at the depot.
Thesis Overview
Chapter 2 reviews the previous literature on aircraft repair network modeling and
simulation, and logistics simulation. Chapter 3 discusses formulation of our model with
the SIMIO simulation platform, input modifications, and assumptions made in the model.
Chapter 4 presents statistical analysis of our simulation results. Chapter 5 provides
conclusions and suggestions for future research.
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II. Literature Review

In today’s environment, logistics is not just a management of transportation
network flow. It involves a complex decision making process in a dynamic environment
to acquire and allocate resources efficiently to cut overall costs and meet the demand.
Such a task requires the ability to explore multiple “what if” scenarios with existing data
and predict outcomes for agile implementation for the Air Force. This chapter reviews the
literature on logistics support systems to examine some of the assumptions and
limitations pointed out by previous works, and discuss approaches appropriate to manage
spare parts management at depot level during normal and increased operational tempo.
Overview
According to Shepherd and Lapide (2000), various trends such as customer
demand for short cycle times, globalization of operations, and greater outsourcing of
manufacturing operations place high importance on optimization of network flow. Such
trends can be also found in Air Force Doctrine Document 4-0, Combat Support, where
the Air Force is trying to create a combat support system to optimize both peacetime and
war time operations while minimizing the forward footprint and maximizing the ability to
transition swiftly from home station to a deployed environment (Department, 2013). All
of these trends emphasize the ability to make tailored decisions for different situations
fast and efficiently. One approach to support this ability is by developing a logistics
support system model to better manage the number of spare parts in depots to support
repair processes during normal and increased operational tempos. The model should
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enable users to forecast spare parts demand at different operational tempos, identify
potential bottlenecks in the logistics system, and recommend a course of action to
mitigate the potential issues. Any recommendation should include identification and
projected capabilities of commercial suppliers, commonly referred to as industrial base
output in support of Air Force logistics.
Simulation Based Decision Support System
Narayanan and others (2003) examined an automated decision support system
(DSS) for logistics planning. Supply chain planning can be very complex in a dynamic
environment. In an effort to reduce some of the complexities in the planning, the authors
created a simulation model with conditional logic and cognitive decision making
processes to perform tasks such as problem identification, evaluation of alternatives,
selection of the best alternative, and implementation of the selected alternative. The
model uses multi-attribute utility theory to weigh the alternatives, and choose the best
one. The simulation model supports real time human interaction to correct for
unaccounted dynamics and errors. Its interface module allows the user to control
parameters of other modules such as parts inventory level, repair resources number, and
supplier information. The performance of the DSS is measured based on its supplier and
part identification accuracy. Results from their analysis indicated statistically significant
improvement when compared with a model without the decision support module. The
classification work indicated that the results were fairly accurate with 0.05 level of
significance for Type 1 error. However, the study was conducted with theoretical data,
and the model was not validated. As for future work and application of the model, the
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authors suggested a web-based or wireless real world data feed into the system to validate
the system under a real world environment. Although human supervision is still required,
this work demonstrated that a model equipped with a decision support module can
certainly narrow down some options in demand assessment, supply allocation, and
logistics routing.
Forecasting Combat Support Requirements
Pyles and Tripp (1982) studied forecasting logistics support demand during war
time. The authors pointed out that logistics resource demands change drastically from
peace time to war time, so one cannot use peace time statistics and experiences to project
the war time demands. In order to simulate the war time demands, Pyles and Tripp (1982)
created two models, one as a Planning Subsystem and one as an Operational Tracking
and Control Subsystem. The Planning Subsystem incrementally increases the sortie
numbers to see what level of logistics resources are required to sustain the increased
flight operations. If meeting the desired operational tempo is not possible, the model
evaluates various alternative logistics scenarios and provides predicted effects of higherthan-planned sortie rates. Once the simulation produces the forecasted resource demand,
the Operational Tracking and Control Subsystem compares the simulated results with
actual logistics performance to identify differences and correct them. Such an approach
focuses on forecasting the logistics support demands at desired war time requirements
and meeting the demand through analysis of alternatives. However, the model also can be
modified to show the maximum mission capabilities that can be maintained with a
limited amount of logistics resources. Our previous experience in the Gulf war shows that
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the level of logistics support did constrain some of our operations, especially at forward
operating bases. From this experience, one cannot ignore the combat support side of
simulations and assume that logistics resources during combat operations are unlimited.
This model can help us assess not only the logistics resource requirements but the
mission capabilities impacted by a logistics constraint as well.
Cook and others (2005) viewed peacetime and war time requirements as core
capabilities and surge. They pointed out that the Air Force logistics system underutilizes
contractors as a source of industrial capabilities, and claimed that the Air Force should
incorporate contractors as a surge asset. Furthermore, the authors said unlike the
purchasing and supply chain approach of Depot Maintenance Reengineering and
Transformation, the Air Force does not have a process to readily acquire contractor
services for a surge period. Cook and others (2005) recommended benchmarking
commercial practices with depot practices as a method to bring contractors in as a source.
People frequently use third party service providers to acquire parts and services because
maintaining those production and servicing capabilities is expensive. The outsourcing
maintenance service may be able to save a lot of already limited Air Force budget, but
one must be cautious not to overuse contractors as a permanent means of providing the
services during a sustainment surge period. Overuse of contractor services can reduce the
internal expertise on the service and make us more dependent on outside expertise. Even
if the use of contractors is limited to short-term surge operations, sometimes it may be
hard to determine the duration of a surge.
Regattieri and others (2005) suggested that depending on the demand level of
spare parts, certain forecasting techniques can be used to maintain the inventory level of
7

spare parts. The forecasting techniques compared in their article are additive/
multiplicative winter, seasonal regression model, single exponential smoothing, double
exponential smoothing, adaptive response rate single exponential smoothing, moving
averages, and weighted moving averages. The article used the following four levels of
demand: slow moving demand, strictly intermittent demand, erratic demand, and lumpy
demand. Although spare part level is strongly related to flying hours, increased flying
hours do not necessarily increase the demand of all spare parts, such as landing gears or
certain radar parts that are only used when an aircraft is on the ground. Instead of using
flying hours to determine the demand level, Regattieri and others (2005) used monthly
inter-demand interval (ADI) and its coefficient of variation (CV) to determine the
‘lumpiness’ of spare parts demand . Figure 1 below shows the area of lumpiness and
relative positions of five spare parts points. The lumpy demand area is determined by
condition tests of “CV > 0.49”, and “ADI > 1.32”. Any points with CV higher than 0.49
and ADI higher than 1.32 are considered to have lumpy demand. Within the area of
lumpy demand, point w has relatively high ADI and CV, so it is lumpier than other points
within the area. The point z has relatively low ADI and low CV, so it is less lumpy than
other points.
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Figure 1: Area of Item Lumpiness (Regattieri and others, 2005)

Performance of the forecasting techniques were compared with historic data, and
evaluated in terms of mean absolute deviation (Regattieri and others, 2005). The results
indicated that all tested forecasting techniques performed well with small values of CV
and ADI (less lumpy demand), especially the single regression model. However, only a
few techniques performed well with lumpy demand such as Winter’s method. In engine
spare part simulation, it may be reasonable to assume that demand is related to flying
hours, which can be estimated based on the historic data, and to classify it as having
lumpy demand. Alternatively, the demand at war time can be assumed fixed for the
duration of the war time at a certain level. Based on the classification of demand level,
different forecasting techniques can be implemented to optimize the inventory level of
engine spare parts.
Rosienkiewicz (2013) stated that many traditional forecasting techniques based on
time series may perform poorly when demand level is lumpy. Instead Rosienkiewicz
(2013) suggested use of artificial intelligence (AI) methods, such as artificial neural
9

networks (ANN), for forecasting. The author collected data of three spare parts (labeled
SP1, SP2 and SP3) with the highest failure rate. Eight different forecasting methods were
selected, which included five traditional forecasting methods such as moving average,
simple exponential smoothing, Syntetos-Boylan method, etc. The remaining three
methods were based on AI such as ANN, ANN hybrid with econometrical prediction
(BIC), and ANN hybrid dedicated to classification tasks. The prediction performance was
measured based on the Root Mean Square Error (RMSE), which is a measure of the
differences between values predicted by a model and the values actually observed.

Figure 2: Root Mean Square Error (Rosienkiewicz, 2013)

Figure 2 above shows that all ANN methods performed better than traditional
methods, especially Hybrid ANN (BIC) method. The article presents an alternative
forecasting method for the spare parts with lumpy demand level, and this can be used to
forecast spare parts demand changes from peace time to war time. Our discussion now
moves from forecasting logistics requirements to modeling and analyzing Air Force
logistics processes.
10

Air Force Logistics Modeling and Simulation
Isaacson and others (1988) presented an implementation of the Dyna-METRIC
version 4 model to assess the effect of war time dynamics and repair constraints on the
worldwide operational performance of Air Force Logistics. This model studies the
interaction of logistics functions between different echelon systems to enhance overall
war time capabilities. Previous studies with the Dyna-METRIC model to assess the
logistics support of aircraft components on single aircraft or within a theater do exist,
however, no previous work involved worldwide assessment such as this work. The model
assumes that the aircraft availability is directly proportional to the aircraft’s component
availability. The aircraft components are categorized as Line Replaceable Units (LRUs),
major components from an aircraft; and Shop Replaceable Units (SRUs), subcomponents
of a LRU. The support structures are categorized as Base, Centralized Intermediate
Repair Facility (CIRF), and Depot. The component flow process can be seen in the
Figure 3.

Figure 3: Aircraft Logistics Support Network (Isaacson and Boren, 1993)
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Failed LRUs are removed from aircraft and sent to a base repair. Replacement
LRUs arrive from a base supply and get installed to the aircraft. The base repair sends the
repaired LRUs to the base supply and sends irreparable LRUs at the base to a CIRF or a
depot. When LRUs are not repairable at the depot, the items get condemned, and new
replacements are ordered from outside suppliers. The model assumes that resource
demands are proportional to either number of sorties or flying hours with such demands
known (Isaacson and Boren, 1993). The authors caution the reader that previous studies
by Crawford (1988), Stevens and Hill (1973) pointed out that these assumptions may not
hold as demand level can differ between organizations and change over time. Issacson
and Boren (1993) later addressed these issues in the Dyna-METRIC version 6 by
incorporating uncertainties such as component demand variation, repair capacity
constraint, information lag, aircraft attrition, battle damage to stock, repair resources, and
repair queue in the model. The Dyna-METRIC version 6 model also added management
adaptation features such as lateral supply, lateral repair, and priority repair policies.
Dyna-METRIC version 6 is a simulation using Monte Carlo sampling techniques to avoid
assumptions such as ample repair capacity, and independent content of the components’
pipelines. The simulation results provide measures of performance such as daily aircraft
availability, sortie generation capability, and status of components in different pipeline
segments. Each simulation run provides a single result while in version 4 the analytical
model provided expected values and probability distributions. Also, unlike version 4,
Dyna-METRIC version 6 does not provide spares requirements. These models are no
longer in use, however, in terms of a historic perspective, this effort is one of the first
attempts to simulate a large scale logistics system. In order to simulate such a large model
12

with relatively limited computational power, both models have several mathematical
assumptions. Later work shows how researchers approached large scale models by
dividing the entire model into smaller submodels to avoid such assumptions and
limitations.
Frontier Inc. (2013) combined the Logistics Composite Model Analysis Toolkit’s
(LCOM ATK) performance assessment capability, and data analysis technique of Metrics
Progress Analysis Engine (MPAE) to create a tool to perform analysis of operational fleet
performance during transition from war time to peacetime to war time. The LCOM ATK
is used to model the repair process of aircraft, and the MPAE was used to analyze the
LCOM ATK output. The study demonstrates the negative impact a reduction in spares
during war time to peacetime transition can have on subsequent war time deployment.
Results of their study quantified the impact of peacetime spares levels on readiness in war
time deployment, the lead time to restore spares inventory levels, and the necessary
spares inventory levels for war time deployment. The model created arbitrary war time
and peacetime mission requirements derived from flying hours data in selected reporting
periods to test the baseline scenario. Based on the war time and peacetime requirements,
the model was first run with enough spares for war time requirement during peacetime to
war time transition, and second with just enough spares for peacetime requirement during
the peacetime to war time transition. The differences in two runs indicated the negative
impact of reduced spares during the transition (Frontier, 2013).
Shyong (2002) simulated the depot level F101 Low Pressure Turbine (LPT) rotor
repair process with varying spare parts level and different queuing policies to reduce the
repair cycle time and cost. Three queuing policies: first in first out, shortest processing
13

time first, and lowest arrival index value first, were evaluated along with varying levels
of spares for a selected set of parts. The baseline assessment of the current repair process
and processing time were based on interviews and data provided by subject matter
experts. The repair process is broken down as front shop processes and back shop
processes. The front shop assembles and replaces parts, while the back shop repairs bad
parts. If spare parts are available at the front shop, there is no delay in the replacement of
parts at the front shop. If no spare parts are available at the front shop, the replacement
process is delayed until the back shop repairs the bad part. When the back shop repairs a
bad part, the repair part is delivered to the front shop to be replaced or stocked as a spare
part. Increasing the spare parts level can reduce the repair cycle time, but increased spare
parts level can be expensive. Also, different parts have different repair flow times, so
arbitrarily increasing the spare parts levels is not the most efficient method to reduce the
repair cycle time. Increasing the spare parts level for the parts with the longest flow time
is the most effective. In order to optimize the tradeoff between the repair cycle time and
the cost of spares, multiple objective linear programming was applied. The simulation
study indicated that the different policies did not significantly impact the repair cycle, but
having a selected level of spare parts reduces the repair cycle time for the rotor engine.
This research (Shyong, 2002) assumes that the arrival rate of parts is consistent
throughout the simulation, which means the operational tempo does not vary. In addition
he does not explicitly model industrial base output in maintaining spare inventory levels.
Our research focuses on removing these limitations with our simulation of Air Force
depot engine repair

14

Summary
The aforementioned works all emphasize the importance of making informed
decisions regarding the supply chain and other processes for large logistics systems such
as Air Force Agile Combat Support managed by Air Force Material Command (AFMC).
Effective and efficient logistics planning requires accurate assessment of spare part
levels. However, in this dynamic environment, especially during a transition from
peacetime to war time, predicting the demand for spares can be challenging. Pyles and
Tripp (1982) and FTI (2013) used previous data to derive these demands; while
Regattieri and others (2005) and Rosienkiewicz (2013) suggested use of forecasting
techniques to project the demand level. A variety of logistics models were used in the
studies reviewed, but the common objective was to find the level of spare parts and other
support to meet a mission requirement. Our research investigates the impact of industrial
base output in maintaining the level of spares and overall depot engine support for the F16 during a transition from peacetime to war time using a simulation developed with
SIMIO. We discuss the design of this model in the next chapter.
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III. Methodology
Overview
This study uses real world data to create a top level model of the F100-229 engine
repair network, and analyzes the impact and interaction between different factors of the
network. Various levels of factors were used to measure significance of the factors. The
simulation model is constructed in SIMIO to explore differences between scenarios to
assess the sensitivities of network factors in day to day and war time environments. This
chapter discusses the development of the top level simulation and the selection of factors
and levels used in the study.
Model Development
The baseline model is built using a conceptual model of the Air Force F100-229
engine repair network. The conceptual model captures an aggregated view of the actual
repair network process flow as shown in Figure 4. The repair network process starts when
an engine arrives at a base maintenance shop. The base shop disassembles the engine into
several modules, and checks for failed modules. Failed modules are replaced with spare
modules, and the engine gets reassembled. The failed modules are sent to the depot for
repair. If the base does not have spare modules at hand, then the base has to wait for good
modules to arrive from the depot. The depot sends available spares from the depot
inventory to the base if the base does not have enough spares for reassembly. If the base
requires spares for reassembly and the depot does not have any spares to send, then the
base has to wait for the failed modules to be repaired at the depot. This wait time for the
failed modules to be repaired for the base is the backorder queue and it represents the
16

number of non-mission capable modules. After the failed modules are repaired, it first
serves the backorder queue, and then restocks the base and depot spares inventory with
priority on the base spares inventory. The repairs are conducted at the depot for all five
modules with all spares returned to base or depot inventory.

Figure 4: Conceptual Model

The real world system is comprised of multiple bases and depots with lateral
supply inventory management policies. The lateral supply policy requires transportation
of spares from one base or depot to another to satisfy repair demand for the spares, and it
creates transportation delays between the bases and the depots. However, transportation
delays are not important in our assessment, are assumed to be generally constant, and are
not explicitly modeled in our simulation. Another important assumption made involves
the depot process to repair broken models. We do not explicitly model any depot
resources such as manpower or equipment along with the waiting times, but roll up the
entire repair time (plus the transportation delays just described) into our turnaround
17

times. Based on these assumptions, the conceptual model was modified to develop the
following baseline model shown in Figure 5. Note we also consolidated base and depot
spares as one.

Figure 5: Baseline Model

Data Requirement and Data Processing
The baseline model requires three sources of input data: the induction rate of
failed modules, the repair turnaround time (TAT) at the depot, and the initial spares
inventory level. The modules selected for this study are Core, Gearbox, Inlet fan, Lowpressure turbine (LPT), and High-pressure turbine (HPT). The core supplies
approximately 20 percent of the total engine thrust and torque for operation of all
accessories. The gearbox holds accessory engine components. The inlet fan sends air to
the forward end of the compressor. The LPT removes energy from the combustion gases
to drive the low-pressure compressor (N1) rotor assembly. The HPT removes energy
from the combustion gases to turn the high-pressure compressor and accessory gearbox
(Hill and others, 2015:426).
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Induction Rate of Failed Modules
The data provided by AFMC/A9A contains total number of modules received by
depot for repair per year from 2007 to 2011. Based on the data, the average total
inductions per year for each module were calculated, and the following formula was used
to obtain the individual daily induction rates:
Induction Rate = 260 ÷ Average Total Inductions per Year

(1)

The 260 represents the total working days in a year (using 5 days per week for 52
weeks) and induction rate represents the interarrival time for the baseline model. The
induction rate is input as an exponential mean for time between arrivals in the simulation.
Table 1 shows the average number inducted and the calculated induction rates for the
modules.
Table 1: Module Induction Rate
Module
Name
Core
Gearbox
Inlet Fan
LPT
HPT

Average Total Induction
Number Per year
58
32.2
48.4
49.2
8.2

Induction Rate
(Days)
4.48
8.07
5.37
5.28
31.71

Repair Turnaround Time
Table 2 shows the repair TAT for the five modules at the depot. The original
mean and standard deviation provided by AFMC/A9A was fitted into a lognormal
distribution, because the repair TAT is better represented by a lognormal distribution than
other theoretical distributions (Kline, 1983).
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Table 2: Module Repair Turnaround Time (Units in Days)
Module Names
Core
Gearbox
Inlet Fan
LPT
HPT

Mean
62.5
88.3
80.4
77.6
121.0

Std
58.4
33.4
31.9
35.7
39.2

Lognormal Mean
3.8222
4.4137
4.3144
4.2555
4.7462

Lognormal Std
0.7918
0.3656
0.3824
0.4380
0.3162

Spares Inventory Level
The depot carries two types of spares in its inventory, serviceable and
unserviceable. The unserviceable spares require additional repairs, so it is not ready for
immediate use. The spares inventory data provided by AFMC/A9A was a snap shot of
depot spares inventory on a given day, but it did not show the average serviceable spares
inventory per year. The mix of serviceable and unserviceable spares varied over time, and
the repair time for unserviceable spares was unavailable. Because of the lack of readily
available data regarding the separate types of spares and to significantly simplify our
simulation logic, we decided to only model serviceable spares, with the assumption that
our initial number of spares and repair logic would reasonably approximate both types of
spares. Since the spares data provided was only a snap shot, we decided to calculate a
reasonable starting level of spares using the provided inductions and TAT as shown in
Equation 2 as the serviceable spares.
Spares Inventory = (Mean TAT + SD TAT ÷ 2) ÷ Induction Rate

(2)

The calculated spares inventory level using Equation 2 is shown in Table 3. As
intended, these values generate enough backorders to assess the impact of factors
explored in our analysis. The standard deviation of TAT was divided in half in order to
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account for the large standard deviation for the Core module. This calculation was not
intended to optimize the availability of any particular module, but rather to provide
reasonable and interesting starting levels for spares. The main focus of this research is to
provide a flexible top level simulation, with the ability to analyze differences in system
performance due to changes in selected factors. This simulation can also be easily
modified, with the appropriate data, to examine other engine repair networks, such as the
JSF F-35 engine.
Table 3: Spares Inventory Level
Module Name
Core
Gearbox
Inlet Fan
LPT
HPT

Spares Inventory
20
13
18
18
4

Selection of Factors and Appropriate Levels
As discussed in Chapter 1, availability of mission capable aircraft is proportional
to the availability of the five major engine modules. A measure for availability of the
engine modules can be captured in our simulation from metrics obtained from the
backorder process in our engine repair network. The two major factors under
consideration for analysis are operational tempo and spares inventory level. The factors
are assessed based on their impact to our backorder metrics.
Operational Tempo
The transition from a peacetime to war time environment can be represented by
changes in the operational tempo. The repair demand of the engine increases with
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additional sorties and flying hours during war time. We model this increase in operational
tempo by increasing the induction rate of the modules. More specifically, with our
simulation we multiply each random number draw for the time between arrivals for each
module by an Operational Tempo Multiplier. The Operational Tempo Multiplier is a
percentage increase in the induction rate, which decreases the time between arrivals
(TBA) of the modules. We selected values of 0.2, 0.4, 0.6 and 0.8 for the Operational
Tempo Multiplier to represent 20%, 40%, 60%, and 80% decrease in the TBA for each
module. In the real world there is likely a different increase in induction rate for each
module, which could be implemented within our simulation. For ease of analysis, we
used the same value for all modules. Testing the different levels of operational tempo can
show how much the transition from peace time to war time affects normal repair network
operations and the resiliency level of the baseline model to recover from a sudden
increase in repair demand.
Spares Inventory Level
Intuitively, setting higher initial spares inventory level should always decrease the
backorder queue and increase the availability of the modules, but maintaining high spares
inventory is costly. Instead of modifying the initial inventory levels, different reorder
policies were developed for evaluation. Our first reorder policy triggers the reorder
process right after the war (which we modeled at 30 days). The second reorder policy we
explore triggers the reorder process 30 days after the war. We originally considered
exceeding a maximum number of backorders to trigger a reorder, however, the maximum
number of backorders always occurred during last days of the war or shortly after. So the

22

results were nearly identical to ordering at the end of the war. This acquisition process
(simply a delay in our model for lead time) represents our top level approach to include
industrial base output in our simulation. We use this lead time as another factor for our
analysis using levels of 130, 150, and 170 days. The first reorder policy is proactive since
it expects additional spares requirement after the war is over. The second reorder policy
is reactive in a sense that it is not triggered until 30 days after the war. The number of
spares ordered with each policy is the difference in spares on hand when the reorder is
triggered from the spares on hand when the war started. Other options for calculating
reorder sizes are available and could be implemented in our simulation, however, this
approach was easy to implement and reasonable.
Simulation Setup and Design
The total length of each simulation replication is 1300 days, which represents a 5
year period with 260 working days per year. In order to provide a reasonable
initialization of the system before collecting data, we used the first 260 days as a warm
up period and collect data over 4 years. Because the model does not have large
variability, 20 replications were conducted for the different scenarios and provided
approximately normal data with acceptable standard deviations. The transition to war
time starts at 260 days (at the beginning of our data collection) and lasts 30 days. The
induction rate for the modules and repair TAT are randomly generated using dedicated
random number streams (specified as last parameter for distributions in SIMIO) to reduce
the random variation between scenarios. Figure 6 shows an example of our induction rate
input in SIMIO using stream 1.
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Figure 6 : Induction Rate Using Assigned Random Number Seed

Once the baseline designs are set up, parameters (treated as experiment controls
by SIMIO) can be included within the process logic to easily allow simulation of
different scenarios. The control panel can be accessed in the Model Facility view in
SIMIO. Figure 7 shows how the Input Control Panel can be used to modify the initial
spares level, induction rates, repair TATs, Operational Tempo, start of war, war time, and
different reorder policies for a single replication. The controls shown here are also
available when creating a SIMIO experiment with a model. This is the approach we use
for setting up our scenarios used for analysis in the next chapter.
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Figure 7: Input Control Panel
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IV. Analysis and Results
Overview
This chapter presents results of the simulations discussed in Chapter 3, and
analysis of the simulation outputs to assess the impact of increased operational tempo and
the spares reorder policies on the repair network. The increased operational tempo places
additional stress to the network, and the reorder policies, which attempt to capture
industrial base output, have different influence on the network performance. The
interactions between these factors are analyzed to identify the factor combinations with
the most impact on the network. We do not perform a formal design of experiment, but
rather provide plots and statistical analysis of differences between our scenarios which
we refer to as Design Points (DP).
For all production runs with our simulation we use a 260 day (52 weeks with 5
work days or 1 year in our model) warm up period to provide an intelligent initialization
state for our simulation before we begin our data collection over 4 years. SIMIO
automatically resets all tally (observational) statistics to zero, however many of our
defined state variables had to be adjusted at the end of the warm up period. As discussed
in Chapter 3, we run 20 replications for each scenario or DP, which provides us with
approximately normal data with reasonable standard deviations.
Operational Tempo
For all scenarios involving an increased Operational Tempo, we model the start of
the ‘war’ at the beginning of year one after initialization with a duration of thirty days,
after which the Operational Tempo returns to baseline level. In order to compare the
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impact of different Operational Tempo levels on the network, the baseline model (no
increase) was compared with different levels of increased Operational Tempo. The
increase in Operational Tempo was simulated with an increase in the module induction
rates. This was implemented in our model by reducing the Time Between Arrival (TBA)
for induction of each modules by a set percentage. For example, an Operational Tempo
factor of 0.8 multiplied by a random draw for each particular TBA, results in a 20%
increase in the induction rate for each module. We use the same rate for each module.
Figure 8 shows the average total number of backorders for baseline (DP 1), 20% increase
(DP 2), 40% increase (DP 3), 60% increase (DP 4) and 80% increase (DP 5). Although
all backorder numbers increase when the Operational Tempo level increases as Figure 8
indicates, not all Operational Tempo levels show a statistically significant difference
from the previous level. The 95% confidence intervals (brown rectangles in Figure 8)
overlap for DP 1, DP 2, and DP 3, which indicates that the differences are not significant.
The confidence intervals for DP 4 and DP 5 are both statistically different from DP 1,
with DP 5 showing a statistically significant jump over DP 4. This increase in back orders
is nonlinear, where it increases gradually before the 40% level, but starts to increase
sharply after 60%.
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Figure 8. Average Total Number of Backorders

In order to assess how the increased operational tempo affects the backorder
number, the total number of backorders over the 4 year period was broken down into
individual rows by year as shown in Table 4. The Table 4 results shows that the major
increase in the number of backorders occurs in year 1, the period that includes war, but
the impact on subsequent years was minimal. For example, DP 5 with an 80% increase in
Operational Tempo, has 156.45 backorders in year 1. However, in the following year, the
number goes down to 43, which is the same as the backorders in the baseline with no
Operational Tempo increase. In fact, the average yearly backorder numbers of different
DPs after year 1, all settle down to about 43 to 45, with no statistically significant
difference.
Table 4. Average Number of Backorders by Year
Year
DP 1
41.6 ± 10.8324
1
43 ± 11.0167
2
44.95 ± 11.9005
3
46.45 ± 6.616
4

DP 2

47.1 ± 11.6116
43.1 ± 10.9273
45.3 ± 12.1693
46.5 ± 6.8992

DP 3

60.1 ± 13.6986
42.85 ± 10.5912
46.6 ± 12.2329
45.55 ± 6.9175
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DP 4

86.05 ± 15.9336
43.85 ± 9.8443
46.3 ± 11.9388
45.25 ± 7.7259

DP 5

156.45 ± 17.4179
43 ± 8.9342
45.65 ± 11.5113
43.75 ± 10.0134

In order to examine whether this apparent leveling off of backorders extended
past our study period of 4 years, we collected data over 14 years for DP1, DP2, and DP3.
As shown in Figure 9, all DPs reached a steady state mean around 41. This shows that the
increase in Operational Tempo has a short term impact on backorder numbers.
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Figure 9. Backorder Numbers Over 14 Years

Because the increase in Operational Tempo only increases the backorders in year
1, the monthly changes in backorder numbers were further investigated as shown in
Figure 10. Most of the backorders occur in the beginning of year 1 when the war takes
place. More specifically, the results indicate that 61.7% of the backorders occurred in the
first 3 months with an 80% increase (DP 5) while only 31.1% occurred during the same
months for the baseline.

29

DP1

DP2

DP3

DP4

DP5

Number of Backorder

50
40
30
20
10
0
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

Months

Figure 10. Monthly Backorders in Year 1

The impact of a sudden increase in backorders was assessed by evaluating the
changes in number of available spares in inventory, to see how the spares inventory
reacts to the surge. Figure 11 indicates that the total number of available spares
approaches zero as time reaches year 4. This figure also shows the sharp drop in the
spares level between months 1 through 8, caused by the surge in demand from the war,
but recovers quickly in month 10. This results indicates that the repair network is resilient
to surges in demand, but in the long run, the level of spares approaches zero. This result
indicates that with the current induction rates for each module and associated depot
TATs, the number of spares available in the repair network are eventually depleted. Our
initial spares level took us out to roughly the end of year 4. Increased spare levels would
push the depletion point out further. In order to maintain some positive level of spares in
the long run, there needs to be a reduction in the induction rate and/or a reduction in the
TAT at the depot. More spares only provide a short term solution without other
improvement.
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Figure 11. Monthly Changes in the Number of Spares
The number of backorder by modules were examined to see individual module’s
contribution to the total number of backorders in Figure 12. The results show that most of
the backorders are caused by Gearbox, Inlet Fan, and LPT, however Core, Inlet Fan, and
LPT are more sensitive to changes in Operational Tempo. This indicates that during day
to day operations, Gearbox, Inlet Fan, and LPT may require additional support to reduce
the overall backorder numbers, but when there is a surge in demand, Core may also
require additional support.
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Figure 12. Number of Backorders by Modules
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DP 5
HPT

Figure 13 shows that the number of individual modules processed follows the
same increasing trend as the average total number of backorders in Figure 8, but at lesser
rate. Core, Inlet Fan, and LPT follow a similar nonlinear trend, but Gearbox and HPT
show a smaller increase in number. Note that the vertical scale is not the same for all
modules. However, when the result was compared to the number of backorders by
modules, both trends are similar to each other.

Figure 13. Number of Modules Processed
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The average time in backorders by modules in Figure 14 follows a similar pattern
as the number of backorders by modules, and the number of modules processed. All these
results indicate that Core, Inlet Fan, and LPT are more vulnerable to the changes in
Operational Tempo, while Gearbox and HPT are more resistant.
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Figure 14. Average Time in Backorder (Days) by Modules

Reorder Policy Comparison
For this part of our analysis our baseline model now uses the 0.6 Operational
Tempo factor (40%) increase in induction rate with no additional spares ordered. This
baseline model is then compared with two different order polices to take an initial look at
levels of industrial base output in producing additional spares to reduce the number of
backorders. The first policy initiates the acquisition process immediately after the war,
and the second policy initiates the acquisition process 30 days after the war. The 30 days
delay for the second policy was a simple attempt to implement a less proactive policy,
demonstrating the impact of a delay in requesting spares. For both policies, the number of
spares ordered is the difference in the inventory level of each module at the start of the
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war and the inventory level when the order is placed. In Figure 15, policy 1 refers to
ordering immediately after the war, while policy 2 refers to the 30 day delay. We also
explore the different levels of lead time: 130 days, 150 days, and 170 days. As shown in
Figure 15, the reduction in backorders becomes larger as the acquisition lead time
becomes shorter. When the acquisition delay approaches the end of year 1, the benefit of
acquiring additional spares diminishes as shown in Reorder Policy 2 with 170 day
acquisition delay. The previous analysis on Operational Tempo revealed that the most of
backorders in year 1 occur in the first 3 months of the year, and this trend intensified as
the Operational Tempo increases. After the first six months, the number of backorders
recovers back to the normal Operational Tempo level, regardless of the level of increase
in the Operational Tempo. This indicates that the additional spares at the latter half of the
year are less effective, but the acquisition delays under consideration are generally longer
than six months. The percent reduction in backorders from Policy 1 with 130 days
acquisition delay, the fastest policy, only reduced total backorders by 8.9% in year 1.

Figure 15. Monthly Backorders in Year 1 at 40% Increase in Operational Tempo

We also repeated our reorder policy analysis at the 60% and 80% increase in the
Operational Tempo and the results were comparable to previous results. The reduction in
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backorders is higher at the 60% and 80% level than the lower Operational Tempo level,
because the total number of backorders with at the higher Operational Tempo level is
larger. However, the percent reduction in backorders decreased as the Operational Tempo
increased. For example, the percent reduction in backorders for Policy 1 with 130 day
acquisition delay at 40% was 8.9%, at 60% was 6.9%, and at 80% was 5.1%. This
decrease in percent reduction is caused by the resiliency of the repair network. Previous
results indicate that all policies only affect the number of backorders in the latter part of
year 1, and the backorder numbers at various Operational Tempo level returns to the
normal Operational Tempo level at the latter part of year 1. Because of this, the degree of
the drop from increased backorder number to the normal backorder number increases as
the Operational Tempo increases, and the percent area under the curve served by different
policies gets smaller as the Operational Tempo level increases. The decrease in percent
reduction in backorder number is observed with shorter acquisition delays such as 90 and
110 days. These results indicated that the additional spares have to arrive within the first
3 months of year 1 to effectively reduce the backorders, and any spares added more than
150 days after the war only reduces total backorders by about 5% in year 1.
Previous results from Figure 11 indicated that the spares level eventually
approaches zero at the end of year 4. This result was revisited with additional spares to
see how added spares affect the spares inventory level in the long run. Figure 16 shows
that the additional spares increase the spares inventory level over a period of a couple of
years, but the increased spare level also gradually approaches zero at the end of year 4.
This shows that additional spares can help reduce backorders in the short term, but do not
provide a permanent solution.
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Figure 16. Monthly Changes in the Number of Spares with Additional Spares

Summary
The Operational Tempo analysis revealed that the number of backorders increase
proportional to the level of increased Operational Tempo. Most of the increase in
backorders occur in the year that contains war, and the backorder numbers return to
normal Operational Tempo level in the subsequent years. Most of backorders in year 1
occur in the early part of the year, and the number of backorders and spares inventory
levels returns to the normal level after 9 months. During normal operations, backorders
are mainly comprised of Gearbox, Inlet Fan, and HPT, but during the increased
Operational Tempo, Core also increases to a significant level.
The Reorder Policy analysis identified that additional spares have to arrive within
the first 3 months of the year 1 to effectively reduce the backorders. Any spares added
150 days after the war do not significantly reduce backorders. The additional spares can
be used as a temporary solution to reduce surges in backorders, but it cannot be a
permanent solution as the spares inventory level eventually approaches zero with given
induction rates and TATs.
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V. Conclusions and Recommendations
Overview
Previous chapters presented literature review, research methods, and analysis of
results to investigate the research question of the impact of Operational Tempo on the
repair network. In this chapter, the individual results from previous chapters are discussed
to show how they answer the research question, which is to find which of the three
factors, the induction rate, repair TAT, or spares inventory level is the most significant to
the availability of mission capable aircraft. Also, based on findings from previous
chapters, future work is recommended.
Conclusions of Research
In Chapter 2, most previous research reviewed in the area of sustainment of repair
networks can be classified in three areas. First approach uses various forecasting
techniques to predict future demand with historic data. With the forecasting approach, the
significance of factors could be determined by their contributions to the future prediction.
The second approach uses an interactive model that adapts to the dynamic environment
of the repair network to build a decision support system. The third approach uses discrete
event simulation to model the flow of major components of the repair network such as
the engine to represent the system. This model does not require active collaboration such
as the interaction model, but is still able to determine the impact of the factors through
simulation. The data presented by AFMC/A9A was adequate to build a top level
simulation of the F-16 engine repair network.
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In Chapter 3, changes to the induction rate were modeled by different Operational
Tempos, changes to the spares inventory level were modeled through two reorder
policies, and the repair TATs were not varied. Analysis of our simulation results in
Chapter 4 showed that the repair network recovers from the war within six months.
Overall our results indicated that during day to day operation that changes to the spare
inventory levels are insignificant in long term sustainment. This is due to the fact that
with the current induction rates and TATs, any reasonable spare levels eventually go to
zero. However, during periods of conflict with sudden surges in demand, additional
spares can have an immediate short term impact in reducing backorders, if the acquisition
lead time is short enough. In the long term, the induction rates and repair TATs are the
most significant factors in sustainment of the repair network.
Recommendations for Future Research
The repair network consists of spares demand, supply chain requirements, and
repair manpower requirements. Although this study models varying levels of induction
rates through different Operational Tempos, it does not model different levels of repair
TATs. As discussed in Chapter 4, the spares levels during day to day operations
eventually reaches zero. Varying levels of repair TAT can be tested to find an efficient
repair TAT reduction point that minimizes the spares use. Also, different types of repair
policy such as cannibalization of same modules in backorder queue to reduce the repair
TAT can be implemented to see the significance in backorder reduction. The reorder
policies tested in the model are based on an assumption of infinite service life of spares.
The revised reorder policy with actual service life of the spares, may change the reorder
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point and frequency, placing more importance on the acquisition lead time. Cost analysis
of the revised reorder policy with varying TATs to maintain an adequate spares inventory
level would be interesting. Lastly, as mentioned in Chapter 3, this simulation can be
modified with appropriate data to examine other engine repair network such as JSF F-35.
Summary
This thesis presents a top level model of F100-229 engine repair network to find
the impact of Operational Tempo on the repair network. Our simulation showed that the
current induction rates are higher than the repair TATs, so the spares inventory is
eventually depleted. Increasing the number of spares can alleviate surges in demand
during increased Operational Tempo if the spares arrive during the period of the surge.
Additional spares do not significantly improve the number of backorders in long term.
Therefore in order to reduce the number of backorders in the long term, the induction
rates and/or the repair TATs have to improve.
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